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Abstract:  A large literature has studied the impact of labour market institutions on wage 
inequality, but their effect on income inequality has received little attention. In this paper we 
argue that personal income inequality is a function of the wage differential, the labour share, and 
the unemployment rate. Labour market institutions then affect income inequality through these 
three channels and their overall effect is theoretically ambiguous. We use a panel of OECD 
countries for the period 1960-2000 to examine these effects. We find that greater unionization 
and a higher degree of wage bargaining coordination have opposite effects on inequality, 
implying conflicting effects of greater union presence on the distribution of income. 
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1. Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in the determinants of inequality, and 
extensive empirical work has tried to assess its evolution and the possible causes of changes over 
time and across countries. The large majority of this work has focussed on a single measure of 
inequality, concentrating on either wage inequality, income inequality, or the labour share (see, for 
example, Katz and Murphy, 1992; Atkinson, 1997; and Blanchard, 1997). Yet all three forms of 
inequality are closely related, as they are likely to have similar causes and potentially affect each 
other. This paper provides a unified framework in which to examine the determinants of wage 
dispersion, the labour share, and the personal distribution of income. We argue that labour 
market institutions are the central element linking these three variables, and use data for OECD 
countries to evaluate the impact of institutions on these three forms of inequality. 
 We start by presenting a unified theoretical framework, which considers how labour 
market institutions affect the three essential labour market outcomes - the wage differential 
between skilled and unskilled workers, the labour share, and the unemployment rate – and, 
through them, personal income inequality. Our analysis involves two steps. First, we model the 
wage determination process. Equilibrium employment and wages are a function of union 
bargaining power, the unemployment benefit, and the capital stock, and in turn determine the 
overall labour share, wage ratio, and unemployment rate.  We then aggregate these three 
measures into the Gini coefficient of the distribution of personal incomes for a model economy. 
Our highly stylised setup considers four types of agents: the jobless who receive the 
unemployment benefit, unskilled workers who receive the unskilled wage, and skilled workers, 
some of whom also own capital and receive profits. There are then three sources of inequality: 
employment versus unemployment, skilled versus unskilled wages, and the rewards to capital 
versus those to labour. In fact, the Gini index for personal incomes can be expressed as a 
function of the relative wage, the unemployment benefit, the labour share, and the proportion of 
the population in each category. This decomposition implies that the effect of labour market 
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institutions on income inequality is ambiguous. For example, both higher union power and 
unemployment benefits increase the unemployment rate, which tends to raise the Gini 
coefficient, but reduce the relative wage, which tends to lower income inequality. Moreover, a 
higher labour share will tend to reduce income disparities between workers and capital owners, 
but increase those between the employed and the unemployed. 
We examine these effects using data for a panel of OECD countries over the period 
1960-2000. We find that greater unionization and a higher degree of wage bargaining 
coordination have opposing effects on inequality, implying conflicting effects of greater union 
presence on the distribution of income. A higher minimum wage is associated with higher 
inequality, as the effect of the resulting increase in unemployment on distribution dominates that 
of a more compressed distribution of wages. The effect of labour market institutions tends to be 
large, and explains a substantial fraction of the variation across countries. The capital-labour ratio 
also emerges as an important variable; high capital-labour ratios are  associated with higher 
unemployment and hence with a more dispersed distribution of income. 
The paper adds to the recent revival of interest in the factors shaping the distributions 
income across countries (see, for example, Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Li et al., 1998; 
Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Breen and García-Peñalosa, 2005). For decades, empirical work on 
income inequality consisted of either single country studies or cross-country tests of the Kuznets 
hypothesis taking the form of regressions of inequality on the level of GDP and its square.1 Only 
recently have variables other than the level of income been considered in cross-country studies, 
such as the level of human capital, the degree of democratisation, or the extent of financial 
development. These have proven useful in explaining inequality in large cross-sections of 
countries with very different political institutions or at very different stages of development, but 
cannot shed light on inequality patterns amongst the much more similar OECD economies. 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Blinder and Esaki (1978) and Jenkins (1995) on the evolution of inequality in the US and UK, 
respectively, Barro (2000) for a discussion of tests of the Kuznets curve, and Parker (2000) for a discussion of the 
problems of time-series analysis of income inequality. 
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Moreover, although this approach is helpful in understanding the underlying causes of inequality, 
it leaves little room for policy recommendations as in most cases the particular mechanism 
through which these variables impact inequality is not understood. By focussing on the basic 
determinants of the distribution of income we want to understand the underlying mechanism 
thought which labour market institutions impact income inequality. 
Two features have dominated the recent literature on the evolution of inequality in 
industrial economies. One has been the increase in income inequality in a number of countries; 
the other the sharp rise in the relative wages in the UK and the US (Atkinson, 1997; Gottschalk 
and Smeeding, 1997). However, few papers have examined the determinants of both wage and 
income inequality. The exceptions are Gottschalk (1997), Mahler (2004) and Gottschalk and 
Danziger (2006). Although they account for the different evolutions of wage and income 
inequality, neither of them provides a unified framework in which the determination of both 
types of inequality can be jointly examined. 
 Our empirical results imply that allowing for the fact that the various forms of inequality 
are jointly determined has important implications. First, they indicate that although wage 
inequality is a crucial determinant of the distribution of personal incomes, the factor distribution 
of income still plays a substantial role as captured by the negative impact of the labour share in 
our regressions for the Gini coefficient. Second, labour market institutions can affect differently 
the various concepts of inequality. For example, we find that although a higher minimum wage 
compresses the distribution of wages, it is associated with higher income inequality because of its 
impact on the unemployment rate.  
 Lastly, our analysis is related to the extensive literature on the impact of labour market 
institutions on both wages and employment. A substantial number of studies have found 
evidence that strong labour market institutions compress wages, using both aggregate and micro-
data (DiNardo et al., 1996; Wallerstein, 1999; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Card et al., 2004; 
Mahler, 2004; and Koeninger et al. 2007).  The evidence on the institutional determinants of 
 
 
4
unemployment is also extensive, and indicates that both a higher unemployment benefit and 
greater unionization tend to increase the unemployment rate (Nickell, 1997; Nickell et al., 2005). 
Bertola et al. (2002) and Baker et al. (2004) examine the impact of labour market institutions on 
employment inequality, while their relationship with macroeconomic variables is studied by 
Bowdler and Nunziata (2007), who find that greater unionization is associated with higher 
inflation rates in OECD countries. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework. It starts 
with an analysis of how labour market institutions determine labour market outcomes. We then 
express the Gini coefficient in terms of the main labour market variables. Section 3 presents the 
data and our results. We then perform a number of counterfactual exercises. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. The determinants of the relative wage, the unemployment rate, and the labour share 
2.1.1. Technological determinants 
We consider an economy with three inputs: capital, denoted by K , skilled workers, H , and 
unskilled workers, L . Output is produced according to a constant elasticity of substitution 
production function using capital, K , and a “labour aggregate”, of the form   
 ( )[ ] σ−σ−β−βσ− α−+α= /11)1( LHKY   with ∞<σ<−1 , 10,10 <β<<α<   (1) 
This production function allows for different degrees of substitutability across factors. The 
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is 1, while that between capital and 
the labour aggregate is )1/(1 σ+ . For 0=σ  the production function would be Cobb-Douglas in 
the three inputs. In line with existing evidence, we assume that the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and the labour aggregate is less than one, which requires 0>σ .2 
Differentiating the production function we obtain factor demand functions,  
                                                          
2 This is consistent with the evidence reported in Hamermesh (1993). 
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( ) σσ+−σα−+αα= /)1()1( xr        (2a) 
( )
L
Kxxwu
σσσ+−σα−+αα−β−= /)1()1()1)(1(     (2b) 
( )
H
Kxxws
σσσ+−σα−+αα−β= /)1()1()1(      (2c) 
where r  is the interest rate, sw  and uw  are respectively the (gross) skilled and unskilled wages, 
and β−β≡ 1/ LHKx .  
The labour share, denoted θ , is defined  as the ratio of total employee compensation to 
value added.  With two types of workers this is simply ( ) YLwHw us /+≡θ . Defining the relative 
wage as us ww /≡ω , and using equations (2) we obtain the inverse relative demand for labour 
and the labour share as 
 
h
1
1
⋅β−
β=ω         (3) 
1
1
1
1
1
)1(
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where )/( LHKk +=  is the capital-labour ratio and LHh /=  relative skilled employment. We 
suppose that the skilled can always work as unskilled, which ensures that the skilled wage will be 
greater than the unskilled one, i.e. 1≥ω . The comparative statics are straight forward, with  
0<∂
ω∂
h
, 
[ ] [ ].       ,)1( σθωσθ sign
k
signsign
h
sign =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂  
A higher relative employment ratio reduces the relative wage, while the impact of the capital-
labour ratio and relative employment on the labour share depends on the elasticity of 
substitution. For 0=σ , the labour share is simply α−=θ 1 , and neither k  nor h  will affect it. 
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Under our assumption that 0>σ  and since 1≥ω , we have 0/ >∂θ∂ k  and 0/ ≤∂∂ hθ . That is, 
a higher capital-labour ratio will increase the labour share, while greater relative skilled 
employment will reduce both the labour share and the relative wage. 
 Before we proceed it is important to note that there are alternative functional forms that 
could have been assumed. Notably, we could have supposed an elasticity of substitution between 
the two types of labour different from 1,3 and allowed the production function to take the more 
general form  ( )[ ] σρσρρσ ββαα /1/)1()1( −−−− −+−+= LHKY . The resulting wage ratio would be 
given by )1()1/( ρ+−β−β=ω h , while ( ) ρρ−ρ− β−+β≡ /1)1( LHKx . None of these changes would 
qualitatively affect our results, and hence we have chosen to use the simpler functional form in 
equation (1). 
 
2.1.2. Institutional determinants 
If labour markets were competitive, equations (3) and (4) would imply that a country’s capital-
labour ratio and its relative supply of skills would be the sole determinants of the labour share 
and the relative wage. However, labour markets are not competitive. Employment levels hence 
differ from factor supplies, and anything that affects employment would in turn affect θ  and ω .  
 Our focus of interest is the role of labour market institutions, and hence we consider a 
bargaining model. We have two types of workers, and it is often argued that skilled and unskilled 
wages are not determined in the same way. In particular, unskilled workers are more likely to be 
covered by union agreements than skilled workers, since they represent the bulk of unions’ 
membership (see Acemoglu et al. 2001). In order to capture this difference, we suppose that 
skilled and unskilled wages are governed by different processes. For unskilled workers, we model 
the wage and employment determination process as the outcome of wage bargaining between a 
single union and a single firm in a right-to-manage framework. The union bargains over unskilled 
                                                          
3 See Katz and Murphy (1992) for evidence that this elasticity is above 1. 
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wages with the firm, and then the latter sets employment. For skilled workers, we suppose that 
imperfect information on the part of the firm about employees’ potential shirking forces the 
former to pay wages above the market clearing level, as in the efficiency wage model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1985). We suppose that workers caught shirking become unemployed, so the outside 
option is the unemployment benefit.   
 This modelling choice is driven by two considerations. First, it implies that labour market 
institutions will have a stronger effect on unskilled than on skilled wages. An alternative approach 
would be to have a single union that bargains over both skilled and unskilled wages, as in 
Koeninger et al. (2007). The comparative statics would be equivalent to those we will derive 
below, but there would be greater symmetry in the way in which institutions affect the wages and 
employment levels of the two types of workers.4 Second, our choice of wage determination 
process for the skilled is driven by the need to have a framework in which there is skilled 
unemployment. The question of the outside option for the skilled is important. It would have 
been possible to assume that skilled workers caught shirking would be fired and then find 
employment as unskilled labour.  However, this would have implied no skilled unemployment, 
which would have been inconsistent with the evidence (see, for example, Nickell, 1997). 5 
 
Union bargaining and the unskilled wage 
Consider first the determination of the unskilled wage and employment level. There is a single 
union that represents only the unskilled, and which has a utilitarian utility function of the form  
( ) ( )[ ])(  ~1 BULLwLU
L
V u −+=       (5) 
                                                          
4 In addition, separate institutional information for skilled and unskilled workers is unavailable, and we are not 
convinced by the solution proposed by Koeninger et al. (2007) of considering the relative institutional variable as 
correlated with its level.  
5 There are of course alternative ways of modelling the skilled labour market, ranging from Akerlof’s (1982) gift 
exchange model to matching or search models, which would also lead to skilled unemployment. We believe these 
would have introduced greater complexity without affecting the basic results. 
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where L  is the unskilled labour force,  (.)U  is the workers’ utility function, B  is the 
unemployment benefit, and the net wage is given by uu ww )1(~ τ−= . Workers are assumed to be 
risk-averse with utility  ρ= ii wwU ~)~( ,  with 10 ≤ρ< .  The bargaining process is then governed 
by 
[ ]( ) ( ) γγρρτ −−−−− 1 ))1((max HwLwYBwL suuwu     (6) 
where γ  is the relative bargaining power of unions. The bargaining solution is obtained by 
maximising this expression with respect to uw , taking into account the fact that, for a given 
skilled wage, changing the unskilled wage affects both skilled and unskilled employment. The 
resulting first-order conditions can be expressed as (see Appendix I), 
  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−τ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ε+θ−
θβ−γ
γ−=τ−ρ
ρ
ρρ
u
L w
B)1(
1
)1(1)1(    (7) 
where Lε  is the elasticity of the demand for unskilled labour. Since Lε , uw , and θ  are functions 
of  H  and L , equation (7) determines uw  as a function of skilled and unskilled employment.  
 
Efficiency wages for skilled workers 
Consider a simple, one-period efficiency wage model. Suppose skilled agents receive a net wage 
ss ww )1(~ τ−= , where τ  is the tax wedge paid to the government as employer and employee 
contributions. The expected utility of shirking is simply ( ) ρρ +τ−−= pBwpU sS )1()1(  and that 
of not-shirking ρ−τ−= ))1(( ewU sN , where p  is the probability of being caught if shirking, and 
e  is the monetary cost of effort. The resulting efficiency wage, sw , is given by the solution to 
( ) ρρρ +τ−−=−τ− pBwpew ss )1()1())1((      (8)  
 
 
9
Differentiation shows that sw  is increasing in B  and e , and decreasing in p . Given sw  and the 
level of unskilled employment, the inverse demand for skilled labour, equation (2c), determines 
skilled employment, H .   
 
Equilibrium and comparative statics  
The equilibrium of the model is then given by equations (2b), (2c), (7), and (8), that is, by  
( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−τ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ε+θ−
θβ−γ
γ−=τ−ρ
ρ
ρρ
u
L w
B1
1
)1(11     (9) 
( )
L
Kxxwu
σσσ+−σα−+αα−β−= /)1()1()1)(1(      (10) 
( )
H
Kxxws
σσσ+−σα−+αα−β= /)1()1()1(       (11) 
( )τϕ= ,,, peBws          (12) 
where ( )peB ,,ϕ  is implicitly defined by (8). Together these four equations determine the 
equilibrium levels of skilled and unskilled employment, H  and L , and the two wages as a 
function of model parameters: the unemployment benefit, B , the bargaining power of the union, 
γ , the capital stock, K , as well as the preference parameters, ρ  and e , and the technological 
parameters, σβα ,, , and p . 
Let )/()(1 HLHLu ++−≡  be the unemployment rate, where H  is the skilled labour 
force. Once H  and L  are determined, we can obtain our three main variables of interest, the 
labour share, the relative wage, and the unemployment rate, which we can express as functions of 
the stock of capital and labour market institutions: ( ),,, γθ=θ BK  ( ),,, γω=ω BK  and 
( )γ= ,, BKuu . 
All comparative statics are derived in Appendix I. Consider first the effect of union 
power. It is possible to show that 
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,0   ,0    ,0 >γ<γ<γ d
du
d
dH
d
dL
  
.0     ,0     ,0 <γ
ω>γ>γ
θ
d
d
d
dh
d
d
 
As in the standard wage bargaining model, the direct effect of greater union bargaining power is 
to reduce unskilled employment. This reduces the marginal product of skilled labour, and skilled 
employment falls in order to maintain the skilled wage at sw . Since both types of employment 
are reduced, the unemployment rate increases. Furthermore, under the assumption that 0>σ , 
the labour share also increases, the reason being that lower levels of employment result in a 
higher capital-labour ratio. The effect of an increase in γ  on unskilled employment can be 
shown to be stronger than that on H , implying an increase in relative skilled employment, and 
hence a reduction in the relative wage.  
 Concerning an increase in the stock of capital, we have  
.0     ,0    ,0 <>>
dK
du
dK
dH
dK
dL  
A higher capital stock raises the marginal product of labour (both unskilled and skilled), leading 
to greater employment of both types of workers for a given wage. In the case of unskilled 
workers, unions react by demanding higher wages, which results in an increase in uw . For 
skilled workers, given a constant efficiency wage, the increase in the capital stock leads to an 
expansion of skilled employment so as to maintain the marginal product of labour constant. 
Moreover, the indirect effects on L  through the change in H  and vice versa reinforce these 
direct impacts. Under reasonable conditions (see Appendix I), we can also show that  
.0     ,0     ,0 <ω>>θ
dK
d
dK
dh
dK
d
 
A greater capital stock has a direct positive effect on θ , as a higher K  increases the marginal 
product of labour, and indirect negative impacts through the increase in both types of 
employment. The positive effect dominates, implying that a greater stock of capital increases the 
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labour share. The effect on skilled employment can also be shown to be greater than that on 
unskilled employment, resulting in a higher h  and hence a lower relative wage. 
 A higher unemployment benefit has two effects. On the one hand, it increases the outside 
option for unskilled workers, hence unions will bargain for a higher wage and accept a lower 
level of employment. On the other, it increases the efficiency wages that the firm must pay to 
skilled workers, which requires the firm to employ fewer skilled workers in order to increase 
their marginal product. The reduction in H  tends to reduce the marginal product of the 
unskilled and hence partially offsets the reduction in L . If the direct effect dominates, so that 
0/ <dBdL , it is then possible to show that 
.0    ,0    ,0 >θ><
dB
d
dB
du
dB
dH  
That is, a higher unemployment benefit reduces both skilled and unskilled employment, 
increasing the rate of unemployment and raising the labour share. The effect on the relative wage 
is ambiguous, as both the skilled and the unskilled wage increase.  
 
2.2. The Gini coefficient in a model economy 
Having established that labour market institutions affect the labour share, relative wage, and  
unemployment rate, we turn to their impact on the distribution of personal incomes. Our 
empirical measure of income inequality will be the Gini coefficient. We hence decompose this 
measure of inequality into its various components for a model economy with four types of 
agents.  
The labour force (or population) is normalised to one, that is, 1=+ HL .  Following our 
set-up in the previous section, workers can be either employed and receive the skilled or unskilled 
wage, ss ww )1(~ τ−=  and uu ww )1(~ τ−= , or unemployed, in which case they receive the 
unemployment benefit B . Some individuals also own capital and receive profits. We assume that 
the owners of capital are always skilled workers, and that they are never unemployed. 
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Furthermore, we assume that the revenue raised from employer/employee contributions, τ , is  
used to finance the unemployment benefit, so that uyB /τθ= .  This implies that the payment of 
net wages, capital income, and unemployment benefit exhausts output, and average income is 
equal to output per capita, y . 
We then have four types of agents characterised as follows:  
(i) A fraction u  of the labour force are unemployed, and receive the unemployment benefit 
B ; 
(ii) A fraction l  of the labour force are unskilled workers earning a net wage uw~ ; 
(iii) A fraction s  of the labour force are skilled workers. Of those κ−s  own no capital and 
have an income equal to the net skilled wage sw~ ; 
(iv) There are κ  worker-capitalists, each of whom earns profits π  as well as the wage sw~ . 
Our assumptions imply that 1=++ uls , and that the profits of each worker-capitalist depend 
on the capital share,  κθ−=π /)1( y .  We further assume an implicit participation constraint 
such that Bwu >~ .  
The degree of income inequality is measured by the Gini concentration index computed 
across subgroups of population. With N  subgroups, the definition of the Gini concentration 
index is 
 ji
N
i
N
j
ji nnyyy
Gini ⋅⋅−= ∑∑
= =1 12
1 ,       (13) 
where iy  is the income in subgroup i , which has relative weight in , and y  is average income.  
Given our assumptions about the population and their incomes, the Gini coefficient can be 
expressed as 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −θ+−+θ−κ−=
y
Bu
y
wwlsGini us
~~
)1)(1( .     (14) 
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The Gini coefficient is thus a function of population proportions ( )slu ,, , the number of capital 
owners κ , the labour share θ , the wage differential, and the unemployment subsidy (expressed 
as the replacement rate with respect to per capita income). A greater wage differential between 
the skilled and the unskilled will raise the Gini coefficient as it increases inequality between 
groups of employed individuals, while a higher rate of unemployment increases inequality. The 
effect of the labour share is ambiguous. This is a standard effect when there is inequality within 
and between groups. The higher the labour share, the lower inequality between capital owners 
and non-capital owners is. However, a higher labour share increases the income differential 
between employed and unemployed individuals, and hence raises inequality  within the group of 
non-capital owners.6 
 Our framework of analysis makes a number of simplifications, which are worth 
mentioning. First, both the distributions of wealth and of wages have been compressed, since we 
only have two types of workers (skilled/unskilled) and one type of wealth-owner. Second, two 
sources of income are missing. One are the rents on assets such as land or intellectual property 
rights and patents, which we ignore as they are a very minor fraction of the total. The other are 
government transfers other than the unemployment benefit, such as public pensions, child and 
housing benefits, etc. Note, however, that private pensions are implicitly included in our 
framework: they can be provided by pension funds, in which case they are capital income, or they 
can be paid by a firm to its former employees, in which case they are (most often) counted as 
labour payments in the company’s balance sheet. Another source of income is income from self-
employment. Self-employment income will be either a reward to labour or to capital, and there is 
                                                          
6 The importance of within versus between group inequality is easily seen if we rewrite the Gini coefficient in an 
alternative way,    
( )
y
Bwuu
y
ww
lsGini us −−+−+θ−κ−=
~
1
~~
)1)(1( , 
where w~  is the average net wage. This expression implies a negative effect of the labour share and an ambiguous 
one of unemployment. This is the effect of within versus between group inequality: the unemployed have a low 
income but are all equal, while the employed have a higher income but there is inequality within this group. We 
would expect that a higher labour share and a lower unemployment rate reduce inequality, but our Gini 
decompositions indicate that within group inequalities generate forces that go in the opposite direction.  
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a controversy about how to impute this income to one or the other factor when calculating 
labour shares.7 Since self-employment income is unlikely to be affected by labour market 
institutions, in most of our analysis we do not include it in the labour share.8 Thirdly, we do not 
distinguish between personal income distribution and household income distribution.9 Lastly, 
note that we have focussed on gross income inequality, with the only tax we have considered 
being the unemployment insurance contribution. We also model the tax rate in a naïve way, 
considering immediate readjustments after a change in unemployment in order to maintain a 
balanced budget; available alternatives not considered here are the lowering of the replacement 
rate or a reduction in coverage (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2003). 
       
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Empirical specification  
We saw in equation (14) that the Gini coefficient of personal incomes could be expressed as a 
function of the labour share, the wage premium to skill, the replacement rate, and population 
shares. The model identifies the determinants of employment and wages for both skilled and 
unskilled workers, and through them of the wage differential, the labour share, and the 
unemployment rate. We start by examining the determinants of these three variables. Denoting 
by itθ  the labour share, by itω  the relative wage, and by itu  the unemployment rate for country i  
in year t , our strategy will consist of estimating the following relationships 
 
ittiititititit aabaaa 143210 ε+λ+δ+µ⋅+γ⋅+⋅+χ⋅+=θ
+++
    (15) 
                                                          
7 See Gollin (2002).  
8 We checked the robustness of our estimates by using labour shares corrected for self-employment and the results 
did not change; see table A.7 of the previous version of this paper (Checchi and García-Peñalosa, 2005). 
9 Kenworthy (2007) and Esping-Andersen (2005) claim that most of the rising trend in household income inequality 
is attributable to changing patterns of income distribution within the family, associated with increased labour market 
participation of women and young people. We hence control for demographics and female participation.  
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ittiititititit ccbccc 243210 ε+λ+δ+µ⋅+γ⋅+⋅+χ⋅+=ω
−±−
    (16) 
ittiititititit ddbdddu 343210 ε+λ+δ+µ⋅+γ⋅+⋅+χ⋅+=
++−
    (17) 
where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=χ itit
it
it LH
Klog  denotes the log of capital per worker; 
it
it
it w
B
b ~=  is the unemployment 
benefit replacement rate; and itγ  captures wage-push factors, and will be proxied by union 
membership rates in the labour force and by the so-called Kaitz index (the ratio between the 
minimum wage and the median wage). The vector itµ  contains a number of other variables that 
have been included in previous analyses of either of the three labour market outcomes. The 
variables iδ  and tλ  denote country and year fixed effects, respectively. The signs reported below 
the coefficients to be estimated indicate the expectations derived from our theoretical model. 
 We lack data for some of the variables in equation (14), such as the distribution of wealth 
(variable κ ) or the number of employed individuals at each level of education (variables l  and 
s ). Therefore we consider the estimation of the following relationship 
          itittiitititititit defgbguggggGini 4543210 ε++λ+δ+µ⋅+⋅+⋅+ω⋅+θ⋅+=  (18) 
We also control for different definitions used to compute the Gini index (concerning the nature 
of the recipient unit and the type of income taken into account) with the variable itdef .  
The coefficient 1g  captures the relative contribution of the factor distribution of income to 
personal income inequality, while 2g  measures the contribution of the wage differential to 
overall inequality. In our highly simplified framework with workers and capitalists, 1g  can be 
interpreted as a measure of the between-group inequality, where groups are to be defined in 
accordance to their position in the production process, while the coefficients 2g , 3g , and 4g  can 
be interpreted as the contribution of inequality within the group of workers. From equation (18) 
we expect 2g  and 3g to be positive, 4g  to be negative, while 1g  has a priori an ambiguous sign. 
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Supposing a higher labour share reduces inequality (i.e. 01 <g ) the effect of institutions could be 
positive or negative. Stronger unions tend to increase the labour share and compress the wage 
distribution, both of which reduce inequality. However, they also increase the unemployment 
rate, which raises the Gini coefficient. An increase in the unemployment benefit raises both the 
labour share and unemployment, and these changes have opposite effects on inequality.  
 Direct estimation of equation (18) is likely to yield biased coefficients, since some 
variables are potentially endogenous and could be correlated with unobservable and/or 
unmeasured variables (such as the degree of risk-aversion or the level of skilled and unskilled 
employment) that may also affect personal income inequality through other channels. In order to 
obtain unbiased estimates, we estimate the simultaneous equation system given by equations (15), 
(16), (17) and (18), through three-stage least squares methods.  
We proceed to examine the effect of institutions in three steps. We start with OLS 
estimations of the effect of LMIs on the three labour outcomes. We then perform OLS  and IV 
estimations for the Gini coefficient as a first approach to explore the correlations between labour 
market outcomes and income inequality. We will then introduce a 3SLS estimation of the system 
formed by equations (15)-(18).  
 
3.2. The data 
Our data cover 16 OECD countries over the period 1960-2000. Details on the data and their 
sources are provided in Appendix II. As is well known, the data on income inequality are 
problematic and international comparisons difficult (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). For this 
reason we use two different sources for our income inequality measure: one measure is obtained 
from Brandolini (2003), who collected comparable measures of income inequality for several 
OECD countries over a sufficiently long run; the other measure is obtained from WIDER 
(2005), which has become the standard dataset for empirical studies of income inequality. 
Brandolini (2003) provides detailed information on the way in which data were collected, 
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allowing us to build a series that is more comparable over time, and most of our analysis will be 
based on them. Unfortunately these two datasets on income inequality overlap only partially, and 
therefore the results are not directly comparable (see figure A.11 in Appendix III), but as a 
robustness check, we replicate our regression equations using the WIDER data (which build on 
Deininger and Squire, 1996).  
Data on labour shares are from the OECD Stan Database (see figure A.12 in Appendix 
II). We use the standard definition of total compensation per employee over value added, 
without any correction for the incomes of the self-employed. This measure fits well our 
theoretical definition of the labour share, which comprises only the income of employed 
individuals. 10The wage differential is proxied by the ratio between 1st and the 9th decile of the 
earnings distribution (from OECD specific database). The earnings distribution is obtained from 
a labour force survey and defined in terms of annual earnings, as a result our measure of wage 
dispersion captures both differences in hourly wage rates and in hours worked. This is not per se 
a problem, since household income clearly depends on both hours worked and wage rates, 
although it implies that the concept of wage inequality used is not exactly equivalent to that used 
in the model in section 2. The alternative would have been to use the decile ratio of the 
distribution of hourly wages, the measure commonly used when examining the evolution wage 
inequality in a particular country. Unfortunately, such a variable is not readily available in a 
comparable form across countries.  
Standard datasets were use to obtain information on labour market institutions and other 
variables. The latter comprise the oil price, capital per worker, trade  openness (measured as the 
ratio of imports plus exports to GDP), average years of education, female labour force 
participation, the proportion of the adult population aged 65 or more, and social security 
transfers as a proportion of GDP (see Appendix II for details).  
                                                          
10 It is important to note that the labour share as obtained from national account tends to be much lower than the 
share of labour earnings in personal income. Our companion paper examines how labour market institutions affect 
the share of labour earnings and through them income inequality. See Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008).   
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Table A.1 in Appendix III reports some descriptive statistics for the main variables in our 
regressions. Data on income inequality are collected infrequently; hence our sample is largely 
determined by the availability of information on the Gini coefficient, but also by the availability 
of data on wage differentials. Although the potential sample size is 640 observations (16 
countries × 40 years), the overlapping between information on the Gini index and wage 
differentials reduced the sample to 130 observations, which cover only 11 countries.11 The panel 
is unbalanced, with countries having between 3 and 37 observations. The US, the UK, Germany, 
Sweden, Italy, and Canada have the most observations. In order to obtain as much information 
as possible from the limited available data we run regressions both for the largest possible sample 
(with non missing observations on income inequality) and for the common 130-observation 
sample.  
Table A.3 reports the descriptive statistics of our entire dataset, whereas table A.4 shows 
the correlation matrix among the same variables. There it is possible to see that income inequality 
exhibits an (unconditional) correlation with labour market outcomes (labour share, wage 
differential, unemployment rate) but with only with some of the labour market institutions 
(namely, the  unemployment benefit and minimum wage) and not with others (union density, 
bargaining coordination, and the tax wedge). 
  
3.3. Determinants of labour market outcomes 
Table 1 examines the determinants of the labour share and presents three alternative 
specifications: without fixed effects, with country fixed effects, and with country and year fixed 
                                                          
11 A larger sample (236 observations) is obtained when we restrict ourselves to the available observations on 
income inequality (Brandolini), labour share and unemployment (see table A.1). As it can be seen from table A.2, a 
significant drop in the number of observations is caused by the lack of observations in the decile ratio. In order not 
to loose information, when using this variable as regressor we replace missing observations with sample averages 
computed over countries. However, when this variable is considered as a dependent variable, the intersection of 
non-missing information for all variables decline to 137 observations, which is then reduced to 130 by excluding 
countries with 1 or 2 observations. 
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effects. These specifications are estimated for both the largest available sample and the common 
sample.  
In column 1 we find that the labour share is increasing in union density rates, but this 
effect disappears when country fixed effects and cyclical factors are properly accounted for using 
year fixed effects (columns 2 and 3). The coefficient on the minimum wage is also unstable across 
specifications.12 Similarly, the unemployment benefit has a negative but not always significant 
correlation with the labour share. The reason for this is likely to be that all three institutions tend 
to both increase wage –which tends to increase the labour share- and reduce employment –which 
tends to reduce it-. Our regression results indicate that these two effects cancel each other out. 
The only institution that has a robust coefficient across specifications and samples is the degree 
of bargaining coordination, with greater coordination being associated with a higher labour share.   
The capital/labour ratio has a positive, large and significant effect on the labour share, as 
implied by our model. We include the price of oil in national currency in order to capture 
exogenous shocks to raw materials prices (this variable also captures the effect of competitive 
devaluations, and the J-effect on internal inflation). The oil price has an unstable coefficient, that 
changes sign across specifications and loses significance in the common sample. Lastly, we have 
considered the potential role of the supply of skills. Time series of labour force composition by 
skills are not available over a long enough time span, therefore we use proxies derived from 
measures of educational attainment. The one reported in the text is the average years of 
education in the adult population, but the enrolment rate has a similar effect. Once country fixed 
effects are included, the education variable displays a negative coefficient, suggesting that as the 
number of skilled individuals increases, the unemployment rate of the skilled rises, reducing the 
incentives to shirk and hence allowing firms to pay a lower skilled wage that in turn reduces the 
wage bill.  
                                                          
12 Using the level of the minimum wage as an explanatory variable is problematic, as it is missing for several 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and UK for most of the sample period). In order not 
 
 
20
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3  approximately here 
 
Our results are in line with those obtained in earlier work. Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003), 
who consider sectoral data for 12 countries over a shorter time span, find a significant correlation 
between the labour share (corrected for self-employment) and the capital-output ratio, strike 
activity, employment adjustment costs (proxied by previous changes in employment) and total 
factor productivity, whereas the oil price is found to be statistically insignificant. While the sign of 
the coefficient on the capital-output ratio varies across sectors (depending on the degree of 
substitutability or complementarity between factors), they find a weakly significant negative 
coefficient on strike activity, which they interpret as lagged responses to wage push factors. 
Blanchard (1997) finds that labour share movements are mainly affected by supply shocks, with 
significant reaction lags. Our results hence support the traditional view that factor shares respond 
to relative factor endowments (here proxied by capital per worker) but that there is evidence that 
wage push factors, captured by bargaining coordination, also play a significant role. 
 In table 2 we report the determinants of the wage differential. We find no evidence of a 
correlation between factor endowments, measured by capital per worker, and the decile ratio, 
probably the result of different degrees of complementarity between capital and labour across 
sectors. An increase in skill availability in the labour force (proxied by our human capital variable) 
tends to depress the relative wage, and indeed we find a negative coefficient on this variable, 
although it looses its significance when we include year fixed effects. We find a strong and 
significant impact of labour market institutions. Not surprisingly, the minimum wage reduces 
wage differentials. The unemployment benefit, which according to the model has an ambiguous 
effect as it increases both skilled and unskilled wages, seems not to be correlated with wage 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to loose degrees of freedom, we have replaced the missing observation with a unitary value, which is cleared away 
with the country fixed effect. 
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dispersion. Bargaining coordination and union density also have negative and significant 
coefficients. The time trend exhibits a positive and significant coefficient in columns 2 and 4, 
capturing the upwards trend in earnings inequality, potentially associated to skill-biased technical 
change. Note also that the coefficients are robust to the change in the sample.  
Koeninger et alt. (2007) study wage inequality in a framework similar to ours, estimating 
the determinants of the P90/P10 ratio for 11 countries over a similar time interval. Our results are 
consistent with their analysis, since both papers find that stronger labour market institutions 
compress wage differentials.13 In contrast to us, Koeninger at al. (2007) include as regressors 
import penetration and R&D intensity to account for skill-biased technological change without 
finding robust effects.14 We limit ourselves to a linear time trend, which is identical across 
countries and bears a positive coefficient. Strong evidence of the effect of unionisation on 
relative wages has also been found by Wallerstein (1999), Rueda and Pontusson (2000), and 
Mahler (2004). 
 Lastly, table 3 examines the institutional determinants of unemployment. Union density 
and the minimum wage are positively correlated with unemployment, while bargaining 
coordination presents a negative correlation, a result also found in recent work (Nickel, Nunziata 
and Ochel, 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006). Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on the 
unemployment benefit is not significant in this equation, while the tax wedge has a negative 
association.15 Note, however, that the coefficient on the unemployment benefit is significant 
when we do not include country dummies suggesting that the positive correlation found in 
previous work (see, for example, Nickell, 1997) is mostly attributable to cross-country variations. 
                                                          
13 This is also consistent with micro-data analysis; see DiNardo et al. (1996) and more recently Card et al. (2004). 
14 A further difference with their analysis is that they consider employment protection. While in their theoretical 
model they assume that skilled and unskilled workers should face different firing cost, due to the lack of data in the 
empirical analysis they resort to the unique series available, produced by OECD. However this series exhibit little 
variation across years, as witnessed by its statistical insignificance when first differences are considered. For this 
reason we have decided not to include EPL into our regressions. 
15 While the standard expectation is of a positive sign (because a higher tax wedge under wage bargaining leads to net 
wage resistance, and therefore increases labour costs and decreases employment), general equilibrium consideration 
may lead to the opposite effect (see Corneo, 1995). 
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While other inequality variables exhibit substantial inertia, unemployment responds to business 
cycle fluctuations, which in econometric modelling is often captured by AR and/or MA 
components. However, given that inequality data are available at irregular intervals, we have  been 
unable to provide a fully satisfactory account of the data-generating-process underlying 
unemployment dynamics.16 
 Macroeconomic variables, such as capital per worker and openness tend to have 
insignificant coefficients, while higher female participation rates are associated with lower 
unemployment, probably capturing the fact that the female labour supply is more elastic to 
labour market conditions than the male labour supply. The time trend exhibits a positive 
coefficient that, in the larger sample, retains its significance even when year fixed effects are 
included. This coefficient seems to capture an upward trend in unemployment which is not 
explained by changes in labour market institutions.    
 To sum up, to a large extent our results are consistent with previous work and indicate 
that labour market institutions are significantly correlated to labour market outcomes. Bargaining 
coordination has an impact on all three labour market outcomes, union density rates and the 
minimum wage affect both wage inequality and unemployment, while the unemployment benefit 
seems not to be correlated with labour market outcomes once country fixed effects are included.  
 
3.4. The determinants of personal income inequality 
We move next to the determinants of personal income inequality. Table 4 reports our estimates 
of equation (18). The first four columns report our results for the largest available sample, and 
the next four those for the common sample.  The 1st and 3rd columns abstract from year fixed 
effects, which are subsequently included in the 2nd and 4th columns; a linear time trend and 
                                                          
16 The poor time-series nature of our data has prevented us from being able to use data on macroeconomic shocks 
and lagged unemployment  that have been shown to be important when explaining unemployment. See Bertola et al. 
(2002) and Nickell et al. (2005). We also find an insignificant correlation between unemployment and the benefit in 
Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008).  
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dummies controlling for changes in definitions are also included.17 We estimate the equation for 
Gini using both OLS and IV estimation. Based on previous results on the determinants of labour 
market outcome, we use as instruments bargaining coordination, union density, minimum wage 
and capital per worker. The IV coefficients differ markedly from those obtained in the OLS 
estimations, indicating that the OLS coefficients are biased, possibly due to unobservable 
components affecting income inequality. Results are consistent across the two samples, although 
the coefficients are of somewhat smaller absolute value in the common sample. 
 
Table 4 approximately here 
 
 The labour share has a negative coefficient, indicating that the between group effect 
dominates, while the wage differential has a positive coefficient.18 The unemployment rate and 
the unemployment benefit, however, have insignificant coefficients in some specifications.  When 
we look at the additional explanatory variables we see that only the population share over 65 
years of age has a consistently significant coefficient, with a greater fraction of aged individuals 
being associated with lower inequality.  This variable has an a priori ambiguous sign, due to the 
opposing effects of an older population on between-group and within-group inequality. The 
negative coefficient implies that the within-group effect dominates, and captures the fact that the 
incomes of retired households are more equally distributed than those of working households. 
Surprisingly, social security transfers are only significant in the OLS estimates for the largest 
sample and have a positive sign. There is weak evidence that a more educated labour force is 
associated with greater inequality, while we find no impact of (our measure of) openness on the 
                                                          
17 The controls for definition include whether the income is gross or net, and whether the recipient is household 
equivalent or person equivalent. We also experimented with errors clustered by countries, without significant 
changes (results are available from the authors). 
18 Kenworthy (2004) uses household income inequality and personal earnings inequality (proxied by p90/p10 ratio) 
computed from LIS (Luxemburg Income Study), with one observation for 14 countries. When regressing the former 
onto the latter, he finds a coefficient comprised between 0.61 and 0.68, depending on various specifications, which is 
much lower than our figures. However sample size and the countries included are not comparable. 
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distribution of household incomes. Diagnostic tests on the instrumental variable estimation 
indicate that our first stage specifications are appropriate for the labour share and the wage 
differential, while the unemployment equation may have problems (possibly because we 
imperfectly control for labour supply and labour demand shocks). The set of instruments passes 
the overidentification test in the larger sample, without converging in one specification of the 
common sample.  
 
Figure 1 approximately here 
 
Our results indicate that year fixed effects are highly significant and have substantial 
explanatory power (as can be seen by the increase in the 2R  once we include them). Figure 1 
reports the year fixed effects obtained in table 4, column 2.  These fixed effects capture the trend 
over time in income inequality averaged across our sample of countries. This trend account for 
2.5 Gini points, which is about a third of the standard deviation of our inequality variable.  Figure 
1 shows that there was a sharp but temporary jump in inequality between the mid-1970s and 
1980, and, starting in 1984, ten years of gradually increasing inequality. Rather than long-run 
trends, these fixed effects illustrate the idea that there are “episodes” of increasing or decreasing 
inequality, as suggested by Atkinson (2007). 
In table 5 we report the coefficients obtained when we estimate the simultaneous 
equation system defined by equations (15), (16), (17) and (18) through three-stage least squares.19 
Our three endogenous variables, the labour share, wage differential and unemployment rate, are 
all correlated with income inequality. The main difference with the estimates of table 4 – both 
OLS and IV – is that the unemployment rate, which was previously insignificant, now has a 
                                                          
19 Each equation is identified by one or more variables: the Gini inequality index by compositional variables (share 
of female employment and older population, and welfare size), labour share by oil price, wage differential by 
educational attainment and unemployment rate by the tax wedge. This identification strategy has been driven by 
consistency with our theoretical model as well as by statistical significance. Note that it has forced us to remove our 
measure of education from the labour share regression.   
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significant and large correlation with inequality, as found in some other work (Blinder and Esaki, 
1978). The unemployment benefit, on the other hand, is not significantly correlated with 
inequality. All three labour market outcomes have an economically significant effect. The wage 
differential exhibits the strongest correlation: an increase of one standard deviation in the 
P90/P10 ratio is associated with an increase in the Gini coefficient of over 11 points. An 
equivalent increase in the labour share reduces inequality by 4 points, and in the unemployment 
rate raises inequality by 5.7 points. Concerning the additional explanatory variables, demographic 
characteristics seem to play little role, while we now find the expected negative and significant 
coefficient on social security transfers. The coefficient on export-imports indicates that more 
open economies exhibit a less dispersed distribution of income.  
 
Table 5 approximately here 
 
The equation for the determination of the labour share (column 2) is consistent with what 
we have already found in the least square estimation (table 1). The wage differential falls with 
higher union density, bargaining coordination, and minimum wage, in line with the OLS 
estimates reported in table 2. Factor endowments are important, with a more educated labour 
force reducing the wage differential and a greater stock of capital increasing both the labour share 
and the decile ratio.  
The unemployment equation also reproduces our previous results. The unemployment 
benefit has no significant effect, while higher union density and minimum wage are positively 
correlated with the unemployment rate. The tax wedge retains its negative sign. The fit of the 
unemployment equation is worse than for the other labour market outcomes (the 2R  is 0.81). 
The reason for the poor results could be that unemployment is more volatile than the other 
variables (wits cyclical dynamics is not perfectly captured by our model, at least in the case of 
Italy and the Netherlands: see figure A.7). Given that inequality data is often available at irregular 
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intervals, we do not have good enough time series information to enable us to capture well the 
dynamics of unemployment. Note that, as in the last column of table 4, a greater stock of capital 
is associated with higher unemployment. This raises the question of the exogeneity of the capital 
stock, as a possible explanation for the sign of this coefficient is that institutions that make labour 
expensive induce firms to substitute capital for labour, resulting in both higher unemployment 
and a larger stock of capital.  
Overall we find that when we allow for the joint determination of the three labour market 
outcomes and inequality the unemployment rate, which previously exerted no impact on the Gini 
coefficient, now has a positive and highly significant coefficient, as predicted by the theory. All 
institutions, except the unemployment benefit, exhibit a significant relationship with inequality. 
Two of them – bargaining coordination and the tax wedge – are negatively correlated with 
income inequality, while the other institutions –union density and the minimum wage– are 
positively correlated.  
 
Figure 2 approximately here 
 
The predictive ability of the model is good, as can be seen from figure 2 that compares 
the actual and the predicted dynamics of the Gini index (see also figures A.5, A.6 and A.7 in 
Appendix III). This is rather impressive if one considers the block recursive nature of the model, 
noting that in addition to its own prediction error, the prediction for the Gini index accumulates 
the prediction errors from the other three endogenous variables. In particular our model captures 
the trend reversal in income inequality observed in most European countries at the end of the 
1970s (notably the Netherlands, France and United Kingdom), which seems to be largely 
explained by the contemporaneous decline in the labour share. 
A number of robustness checks are reported in Appendix III. A first possible concern is 
that the inequality series are non-stationary. A Dickey-Fuller test (reported in table A.8 for the 
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version with constant, without time trend and with one lag – similar results are obtained when 
varying these patterns) indicates that there is a variety of patterns across countries, with some 
series being stationary in levels, others in first differences, and others in neither of the two forms. 
In addition, for a few countries it is impossible to assess stationarity due to the discontinuity of 
the series There seems therefore to be no reason to prefer estimating the model in first 
differences, although we run such regressions nevertheless, the results being reported in table 
A.9, where we still find evidence of a significant correlation for the labour share and the wage 
differential, although somewhat weaker. We also consider alternative data on income inequality, 
and perform a 3SLS using Gini coefficients obtained by WIDER and find comparable results; see 
table A.10 in the appendix.  
 
3.5. Changes in institutions 
Putting together the results from our four equation system, and being aware that our regressions 
can capture a causal relationship if and only if our LMIs were fully exogenous, we can examine 
the different impact that the various institutions have on inequality. Our estimates indicate that:  
(i) greater bargaining coordination increases the labour share and reduces the wage ratio, 
both of which result in a more dispersed distribution of income; 
(ii) a higher minimum wage is associated with a lower wage ratio and a higher rate of 
unemployment, which have offsetting effects on inequality; 
(iii) greater union density tends to reduce inequality as it results in a lower wage ratio, 
while its effect through the rate of unemployment tends to increase it; 
(iv) a higher tax wedge decreases unemployment and hence inequality;  
(v) we find no evidence of a robust effect of the unemployment benefit on inequality. 
The estimated coefficients reported in table 5 do not provide us with the magnitude of 
the correlations between the relevant variables, especially when taking into account the opposite 
effects associated with different intermediate inequality measures. For this reason, we have 
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carried out an exercise, reported in table 6, consisting of computing the effect on the Gini index 
and the intermediate inequality variables of increasing each of the explanatory variables by one 
standard deviation.20 We use the 3SLS estimates of table 6 and report the resulting impact as a 
proportion of the standard deviation of the endogenous variables. 
 
Table 6 approximately here 
 
Union presence – measured by union density and wage bargaining coordination - has two 
opposing effects on inequality. On the one hand, greater bargaining coordination increases the 
labour share and reduces the wage ratio, tending to reduce inequality. On the other, greater union 
density increases unemployment which tends to increase inequality (although this effect is 
reduced by the fact that higher density reduces the wage ratio). The table highlights the trade-off 
that emerges between union density, which tends to increase inequality, and wage bargaining, 
which tends to reduce it. Although the opposite sign of the impact of certain institutions on 
employment and average wages has already been identified (for example Bertola et al., 2001), 
what is novel here is the focus on income inequality. Since institutions often move together – as 
is the case of union density and wage bargaining coordination – the question of how labour 
market reforms would impact on inequality becomes difficult to answer. The estimated 
coefficients imply that the equalizing effect of bargaining coordination is weaker than the 
unequalizing impact of density.  
As we have seen, the minimum wage has an a priori ambiguous effect on inequality due 
to its offsetting effects on the wage ratio and unemployment.  Our estimates indicate that the 
effect through unemployment dominates, implying that a higher minimum wage tends to increase 
inequality. This institution has the strongest impact on inequality. An increase in the minimum 
wage by one standard deviation raises inequality by 1.3 standard deviations, i.e. by 9.6 Gini 
                                                          
20 These effects are computed by using all the estimated coefficients reported in table 5, irrespective of their 
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points. The tax wedge also has a large impact on inequality, reducing the Gini coefficient by 
almost one standard deviation.  
The two types of capital have strong correlations with income inequality, with the overall 
impact being positive for physical capital and negative for human capital. A higher capital-labour 
ratio increases the labour share but also unemployment, and the overall effect is to widen income 
dispersion. Meanwhile, a more educated labour force leads to a lower skill premium, implying 
that more education is associated with less income inequality.21  The magnitude of these two 
effects is roughly the same, with an increase in one standard deviation in capital per worker and 
in years of education resulting in a change of 4 and –4.3 Gini points, respectively. An equivalent 
increase in trade openness reduces inequality by 4.6 points. Higher oil prices induce a large 
reduction in the labour share, which results in a particularly strong impact on inequality: the Gini 
coefficient increases by almost one standard deviation.  
 
3.6. Counterfactual exercises 
We have performed two counterfactual exercises to assess the importance of the various labour 
market variables. Such exercises need to be interpreted with care as we are implicitly assuming the 
exogeneity of institutions.  
 To illustrate the process, consider figure 3 which depicts income inequality and the three 
labour market outcomes in Germany. Using the estimated coefficients in table 5, we have 
obtained the predicted values for the labour share, wage differential and unemployment rate for 
all the country/year observations available in the sample. We then use these values to further 
predict the Gini coefficient.  The figure shows, in addition to the standard prediction (continuous 
line), the predicted value for the four endogenous variables obtained when we replace German 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
statistical significance, otherwise the predicted value would be different from the sample mean. 
21 Barro (2000) finds a negative correlation between inequality and secondary school enrolment and a positive 
correlation with tertiary enrolment; these findings are difficult to compare with ours, since we have a stock measure, 
combining three levels of educational attainment. 
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labour market institutions with British ones (long-dashed line). The figure illustrates that  income 
inequality in Germany would have been between 8 and 10 Gini points higher if it had 
experienced the same institutions as the UK. Higher inequality would be the result of a lower 
labour share, especially towards the end of our sample period, and a higher rate of 
unemployment. Note that these simulations contradict the perception that higher inequality is 
associated with lower unemployment, as the rate of unemployment itself is a crucial element 
determining the degree of household income inequality. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 approximately here 
 
In figure 4 we obtained the predictions for our four variables of interest for the UK, 
using both British institutions (continuous line) and Finnish ones (long-dashed line). The overall 
effect is a reduction in the Gini coefficient of between 9 and 10 points. This is almost twice the 
average difference in the actual Gini between the two countries, which is of 5.6 points. The sharp 
decline in inequality is the effect of much greater union density and bargaining coordination in 
Finland, that results in a major reduction in wage inequality. Changes in the labour share play 
little role (recall that union density and coordination have opposite effects on the labour share), 
while unemployment is higher with Finish institutions only in the latter years.  
 
4. Conclusions  
The recent literature on the determinants of personal income inequality has emphasized the role 
of a number of factors such as globalisation, financial development, and political stability.  These 
variables help us explain distributional differences in a large cross-sections of countries, but have 
little explanatory power when trying to understand differences across the rather similar OECD 
economies. In this paper we have argued that labour market institutions play an essential role in 
explaining differences in inequality within the OECD, both across countries and over time. 
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 We highlight the different channels through which labour market institutions affect 
inequality. These institutions affect simultaneously relative wages, the labour and capital shares, 
and the unemployment rate, and hence the distribution of personal incomes, but their overall 
impact is a priori ambiguous. We have found that labour market institutions significantly affect 
income inequality, but that different institutions operate through different channels. Union 
presence has two opposing impacts. On the one hand, greater union density increases the 
unemployment rate and hence income inequality. On the other, greater bargaining coordination 
reduces the wage differential and increases the labour share, both on which tend to make the 
distribution of income more dispersed. The minimum wage is the institution that exhibits the 
strongest correlation with inequality. A higher minimum wage compresses the distribution of 
earnings, which tends to reduce the Gini coefficient, but raises unemployment, which tends to 
increase it. Our estimates indicate that the latter effect dominates, resulting in a positive 
correlation between the minimum wage and income inequality. To our surprise we found no 
evidence of either a direct or an indirect effect of the unemployment benefit on the distribution 
of income. 
 Together with labour market institutions, factor endowments have a strong impact on 
distribution. A higher capital-labour ratio increases the labour share, but also the wage differential 
and unemployment, and the overall impact is to raise income inequality. Meanwhile, a more 
educated labour force results in a lower skill premium, leading to a less dispersed distribution of 
income, while greater trade openness tends to have a direct negative impact on inequality. A 
caveat is, however, in order. Our analysis is static and takes both the degree of openness and the 
stock of physical and human capital as given. This implies that we are ignoring the potential 
impact of labour market institutions on capital formation and trade patterns. These are important 
questions that remain to be addressed in future work. 
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Figure 1 – Estimated year fixed effects, from table 4 – Gini index on income inequality 
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Figure 2 – Predictive ability of the model estimated in table 5 – Gini index on income inequality 
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Figure 3 – Counterfactual 1: Germany with UK labour market institutions 
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Figure 4 – Counterfactual 2: UK with Finnish labour market institutions 
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Table 1 – Determinants of labour share – OLS regressions  
 
 larger sample common sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 
unemployment benefit -3.226 -2.492 1.98 -15.511 -0.857 
 [1.71]* [0.56] [0.65] [3.63]*** [0.18] 
bargaining coordination 0.981 3.178 2.202 3.299 2.382 
 [2.06]** [5.68]*** [3.66]*** [3.97]*** [2.41]** 
union density rates 8.313 4.477 -3.357 -7.358 -4.955 
 [4.60]*** [0.89] [0.96] [1.15] [0.95] 
ratio minimum/median wage -4.012 -6.092 0.9 4.668 10.735 
 [2.49]** [1.76]* [0.24] [0.89] [1.79]* 
log capital per worker -5.927 20.32 21.477 23.921 26.679 
 [4.43]*** [5.94]*** [7.10]*** [6.04]*** [5.39]*** 
log oil price in national currency -0.146 0.645 -1.832 0.395 -1.008 
 [0.87] [3.36]*** [3.21]*** [1.24] [0.83] 
average years of education 1.656 -3.056 -6.248 -3.744 -7.645 
 [5.50]*** [2.67]*** [4.98]*** [2.60]** [4.50]*** 
time trend -0.083 -0.322 0.03 -0.355 0.026 
 [1.64] [2.26]** [0.21] [2.56]** [0.15] 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects   yes  yes 
Observations 213♣ 213♣ 213♣ 130♠ 130♠ 
R² 0.50 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.95 
Number of countries 14 14 14 11 11 
 
Robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
♣ Countries included: Australia (6), Belgium (4), Canada (24), Denmark (10), Finland (14), France (6), Germany (26), Italy (23), Netherlands (9), New 
Zealand (3), Norway (8), Sweden (21), United Kingdom (28), United States (31). 
♠ Countries included: Canada (11), Denmark (10), Finland (10), France (6), Germany (10), Italy (10), Netherlands (9), Norway (7), Sweden (11), United 
Kingdom (23), United States (23). 
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Table 2 – Determinants of p90/p10 decile ratio – OLS regressions  
 
 larger sample common sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 
unemployment benefit -0.073 0.468 0.129 0.598 0.297 
 [0.31] [0.96] [0.24] [1.20] [0.55] 
bargaining coordination -0.573 -0.172 -0.127 -0.189 -0.149 
 [11.16]*** [2.73]*** [1.82]* [3.05]*** [2.09]** 
union density rates -0.606 -1.873 -1.717 -2.09 -1.96 
 [3.70]*** [4.35]*** [4.00]*** [4.67]*** [4.38]*** 
ratio minimum/median wage -0.773 -4.342 -3.739 -4.3 -3.713 
 [5.25]*** [5.87]*** [6.05]*** [5.58]*** [6.15]*** 
log capital per worker -0.056 -0.293 0.155 -0.266 0.191 
 [0.46] [0.74] [0.33] [0.66] [0.40] 
average years of education 0.143 -0.311 -0.265 -0.316 -0.268 
 [6.00]*** [1.92]* [1.57] [1.92]* [1.59] 
time trend -0.011 0.034 0.019 0.033 0.018 
 [1.58] [1.92]* [0.99] [1.86]* [0.92] 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects   yes  yes 
Observations 137♣ 137♣ 137♣ 130♠ 130♠ 
R² 0.89 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Number of countries 14 14 14 11 11 
 
Robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
♣ Countries included: Australia (4), Belgium (1), Canada (11), Denmark (10), Finland (10), France (6), Germany (10), Italy (10), Netherlands (9), New 
Zealand (2), Norway (7), Sweden (11), United Kingdom (23), United States (23). 
♠ Countries included: Canada (11), Denmark (10), Finland (10), France (6), Germany (10), Italy (10), Netherlands (9), Norway (7), Sweden (11), United 
Kingdom (23), United States (23). 
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Table 3 – Determinants of unemployment rate – OLS regressions  
 
 larger sample common sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 
unemployment benefit 6.414 1.102 -2.785 6.865 -6.739 
 [4.18]*** [0.32] [0.61] [1.12] [1.13] 
bargaining coordination -2.173 -1.615 -0.762 -1.721 0.779 
 [5.17]*** [2.74]*** [1.27] [1.88]* [0.78] 
union density rates 6.015 12.241 9.805 28.099 27.281 
 [2.52]** [2.47]** [1.75]* [3.31]*** [2.92]*** 
ratio minimum/median wage -2.969 8.999 8.312 23.809 25.651 
 [3.08]*** [1.18] [1.29] [2.44]** [2.32]** 
tax wedge 0.066 -10.895 -9.32 -13.342 -19.553 
 [0.03] [2.50]** [2.27]** [1.71]* [2.49]** 
log capital per worker -0.664 -2.8 -0.057 0.094 11.548 
 [1.00] [1.00] [0.02] [0.02] [2.38]** 
exports plus imports as % of GDP 0.016 0.011 -0.052 0.013 -0.039 
 [1.10] [0.36] [1.33] [0.39] [0.81] 
female labour force participation  -13.608 -19.071 -17.885 -14.005 -25.207 
 [4.64]*** [1.66]* [1.74]* [0.96] [1.87]* 
time trend 0.261 0.467 0.4 0.461 0.225 
 [6.35]*** [5.34]*** [3.26]*** [3.21]*** [1.45] 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects   yes  yes 
Observations 208♣ 208♣ 208♣ 130♠ 130♠ 
R² 0.74 0.80 0.86 0.76 0.86 
Number of countries 14 14 14 11 11 
 
Robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
♣ Countries included: Australia (4), Belgium (4), Canada (24), Denmark (10), Finland (14), France (6), Germany (24), Italy (23), Netherlands (9), New 
Zealand (2), Norway (8), Sweden (21), United Kingdom (28), United States (31). 
♠ Countries included: Canada (11), Denmark (10), Finland (10), France (6), Germany (10), Italy (10), Netherlands (9), Norway (7), Sweden (11), United 
Kingdom (23), United States (23). 
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Table 4 – Determinants of personal income inequality – larger and common samples – OLS and 
IV estimates 
 
 
larger sample  
(using the extended p90/p10 measure) 
common sample  
(using the actual p90/p10 measure) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
labour share at market price  -0.385 -0.49 -1.182 -1.184 -0.362 -0.429 -0.276 -0.601 
 [5.19]*** [4.42]*** [1.01] [3.09]*** [3.53]*** [3.64]*** [1.13] [3.59]*** 
extended p90/p10 decile ratio 2.785 5.217 11.175 25.295 4.067 5.566 9.294 13.547 
 [2.83]*** [3.58]*** [1.36] [3.79]*** [2.50]** [2.94]*** [3.06]*** [6.27]*** 
unemployment rate -0.255 -0.202 -3.31 -0.326 -0.203 -0.243 -1.731 -0.207 
 [2.01]** [1.34] [0.69] [0.16] [1.34] [1.73]* [1.29] [0.30] 
unemployment benefit -18.658 -19.696 -30.858 -15.769 -6.295 -9.535 6.202 -2.701 
 [4.19]*** [4.95]*** [1.43] [0.99] [1.32] [1.75]* [0.47] [0.47] 
average years of education -2.92 0.698 15.847 11.754 2.839 6.302 13.951 9.795 
 [1.74]* [0.32] [0.72] [1.01] [1.10] [2.44]** [1.68]* [2.20]** 
female labour force participation (15-64) -0.854 3.043 -26.518 -0.122 -4.716 -3.282 -5.589 -0.967 
 [0.35] [0.60] [0.68] [0.01] [1.15] [0.69] [0.42] [0.15] 
proportion of population aged 65 or more  -107.378 -160.042 -492.534 -318.795 -56.285 -101.434 -351.643 -208.926 
 [3.01]*** [4.43]*** [0.94] [1.98]** [1.40] [2.27]** [1.71]* [2.31]** 
social security transfers as % of GDP  0.515 0.413 3.164 0.699 0.236 0.101 1.89 0.216 
 [3.07]*** [2.54]** [0.81] [0.47] [1.28] [0.60] [1.34] [0.32] 
exports plus imports as % of GDP -0.044 -0.079 0.068 -0.067 -0.033 -0.039 0.141 -0.031 
 [1.53] [2.18]** [0.56] [1.05] [0.81] [0.89] [1.05] [0.50] 
time trend 0.436 0.211 -0.953 -0.926 -0.056 -0.259 -0.948 -2.176 
 [2.60]** [0.97] [0.68] [1.09] [0.20] [0.91] [1.40] [1.68]* 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 208♣ 208♣ 208♣ 208♣ 130♠ 130♠ 130♠ 130♠ 
Number of countries 14 14 14 14 11 11 11 11 
R-squared 0.52 0.59 0.71 0.8 0.60 0.72 0.89 0.94 
Hansen J statistics (overidentification)   2.76 4.87   3.5 na 
Hansen J statistics pvalue    0.25 0.09   0.17 na 
F-test for first-stage regression for labour share   20.80 19.86   11.99 6.34 
F-test for first-stage regression for decile ratio   4.85 2.66   19.21 8.25 
F-test for first-stage regression for unemployment   1.91 0.79   0.92 0.54 
 
Robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Controls for changes in definition included. 
Endogenous variables: labour share, unemployment rate, p90/p10. 
Instruments: (log)capital×worker, tax wedge, minimum wage, bargaining coordination, union density. 
♣ Countries included: Australia (4), Belgium (4), Canada (24), Denmark (10), Finland (14), France (6), Germany (24), Italy (23), 
Netherlands (9), New Zealand (2), Norway (8), Sweden (21), United Kingdom (28), United States (31). 
♠ Countries included: Canada (11), Denmark (10), Finland (10), France (6), Germany (10), Italy (10), Netherlands (9), Norway (7), 
Sweden (11), United Kingdom (23), United States (23). 
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Table 5. – Determinants of personal income inequality – 3SLS regressions  
 
 common sample 
 1 2 3 4 
 gini1 labour share 
decile 
ratio 
unempl. 
rate 
labour share at market price -0.97    
 [5.01]***    
p90/p10 decile ratio 15.024    
 [6.16]***    
unemployment rate 1.802    
 [4.53]***    
unemployment benefit -6.815 -4.928 0.21 0.364 
 [1.11] [1.07] [0.56] [0.06] 
union density rate  -2.003 -2.036 30.688 
  [0.45] [6.11]*** [5.60]*** 
bargaining coordination  2.285 -0.137 0.864 
  [3.29]*** [2.41]** [1.01] 
ratio minimum/median wage  -6.928 -3.659 44.977 
  [1.25] [7.48]*** [6.61]*** 
tax wedge    -35.578 
    [5.75]*** 
average years of education   -0.21  
   [1.67]*  
log oil price in national currency  -2.996   
  [3.25]***   
log capital per worker  18.101 0.191 14.141 
  [4.84]*** [0.59] [3.07]*** 
female labour force participation (15-64) 7.038    
 [1.31]    
proportion of population aged 65 or more  69.606    
 [1.15]    
social security transfers as % of GDP  -1.467    
 [3.57]***    
exports plus imports as % of GDP -0.133   -0.029 
 [3.11]***   [0.79] 
Constant yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 130♣ 130♣ 130♣ 130♣ 
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 
Root mean squared error 2.16 1.1 0.08 1.31 
R² 0.89 0.94 0.99 0.81 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Controls for changes in definition included. 
♣ Countries included: Canada (11), Denmark (10), Finland (10), France (6), Germany (10), Italy (10), Netherlands (9), Norway (7), 
Sweden (11), United Kingdom (23), United States (23). 
 
Table 6 – The effect of an increase of exogenous variables of 1 standard deviation   
 gini1 
labour 
share 
decile 
ratio 
unempl. 
rate 
bargaining coordination -0.304* 0.382* -0.128 0.211 
union density rates 0.866* -0.097 -0.554* 2.179* 
ratio minimum/median wage 1.327* -0.418 -1.240* 3.978* 
tax wedge -0.960*   -1.165* 
unemployment benefit 0.037 -0.153 0.037 0.017 
log capital per worker 0.549* 1.373* 0.081 1.571* 
average years of education -0.599*  -0.334*  
exports plus imports as % of GDP -0.630*   -0.218 
log oil price in national currency 0.934* -1.437*   
 
Estimates used are those reported in table 5. The effect on the endogenous variables is measured as fraction of 
standard deviation of the latter.  
 * significant at least 10% 
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Appendix I:  Wage and Employment Determination 
 
The Bargaining Model 
The bargaining problem is given by  
 [ ] ( ) γ−γρρ −−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −τ− 1)())1((max HwLwYBwLL suuwu      (A.1)
 The resulting first-order condition is 
us
u
L
u
u LwHwY
BwL
w
Bw −−
−τ−
γ
γ−=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
ε⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−τ−−τ−ρ
ρρρρρρ−ρ ))1((1)1()1(1    (A.2) 
Given the definition of the labour share, we can write (A.2) as  
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Comparative Statics 
Consider first a number of comparative statics obtained from the production function. From 
equations (2), we obtain the elasticities of demand for the two types of labour 
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From equations (1)-(4), (11), (12), (A.4) and (A.5) we have  
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Using (11), we can shown  
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Write the equilibrium of the bargaining problem (A.3) as ),(),,()1( uL wBgf γεθ=τ−ρ ρ , where 
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These expressions can be used to derive the comparative static effects. In fact  
 
 
46
1
/
∆
γ∂∂−=γ
fg
d
dL         (A.12) 
 
1
2
∆
∆−=
dK
dL          (A.13) 
1
3/
∆
∆+∂∂⋅−= Bgf
dB
dL        (A.14) 
The impact of parameter changes may depend on the elasticity of substitution in production. 
Hence we need to consider three possible cases. 
 
Case 1: 0>σ  
Using (A.6)-(A.9) and the fact that 0>σ  implies 0/ >∂θ∂ x , we can establish: 0<∆ , 01 <∆ , 
,02 >∆  while 3∆  may be positive or negative. Hence  
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From (A.6)-(A.9) we can now establish the effects of an increase in union bargaining 
power: 
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An increase in the capital stock raises both skilled and unskilled employment, 
0/ >dKdL , 0/ >dKdH . However, the impact of K  on ω  and θ  is ambiguous, as the 
increases in H , L  and K  have effects of opposite sign. However, we can obtain 
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If the elasticity of unskilled labour with respect to capital is less than one, then these two 
expressions are positive, implying 0/ <ω dKd  and 0/ >θ dKd . 
The effects of an increase of B  are ambiguous. However, if  0/ <dBdL , it is then 
possible to show that 
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Case 2: 0=σ  
In this case 0/ =∂θ∂ x , hence 0=∆ , 01 <∆ , ,02 >∆  and 03 <∆ . Then  
0<γd
dL ,   0>
dK
dL ,   0<
dB
dL .       
It is straightforward to show that the effects on ω  are as in case 1, while there is no impact on θ .  
 
Case 3: 0<σ  
In this case 0/ <∂θ∂ x , hence 0>∆ , 03 <∆ , and 1∆  and  2∆  can be positive or negative. 
From the expressions in (A.12) to (A.14), it is clear that the comparative statics cannot be signed. 
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Appendix II: Data sources 
Data on income inequality are obtained from two alternative sources: the variable GINI1 is 
obtained from Brandolini 2003, whereas the variable GINI2 is from WIDER (June 2005). In both 
cases we have controlled for the type of income (“gross”, “disposable” or “net”) and the type of 
recipient (“household”, “household equivalent” or “person equivalent”). As it can be seen by the 
figure A.11 below, the two indices provide very similar information for Italy, United Kingdom 
and United States, but not for other countries (especially for Nordic countries). 
 
Data on labour shares are obtained from the OECD-Stan dataset, reconstructed backward to the 
60’s from the Research Group at the Bank of France, and made available to us by Emilie Daudey 
(see Daudey, 2005). They are defined as the ratio between “compensation per employees” and 
“gross domestic product (income approach)”, at current prices, for the entire economy. In 
alternative specification we have restricted to the manufacturing sector, without significant 
differences (apart from the different mean values). Graphs of the variables are reported in figure 
A.12. The data can be corrected in order to include the self-employed (see Gollin, 2002). The 
most common adjusted measure of the labour share is obtained by assigning to the self-employed 
the average earnings of employees (also reported in figure A.12). Since we do not find this 
assumption very convincing, we stick to the unadjusted labour share.  
 
Data on unemployment rates are from Nickell and Nunziata 2001, whereas the replacement rate 
of the unemployment subsidy is obtained on a biannual base by OECD 2002 (and then replicated 
for the missing years). The wage differential is computed as the ratio between the 9th and 1st 
earnings decile, on data on earnings distribution from OECD (Trends in earning dispersion 
database). The Kaitz index (minimum to median wage) is obtained from OECD (Minimum wage 
database). For countries were minimum wages are non-existent this variable has been set equal to 
unity  (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and UK for most of the sample 
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period). Data on union density (ratio between union membership and active dependent 
employment) have been kindly provided by Jelle Visser (University of Amsterdam). Lastly, the 
tax wedge measure is obtained from Nickell and Nunziata 2001. 
 
The capital stock is derived from the Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6 (see Summer and Heston 
1991). Since data on labour force composition by skills are not available over a long time span, 
we relied on a proxy derived from educational attainment, i.e. measures of human capital, the 
average years of education in the adult population, from Cohen and Soto (2007). The oil price in 
national currency is computed from the IMF Financial Statistics. Female participation, age 
composition and social transfer are obtained from Comparative Welfare States Data Set, 
assembled by Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens (December 1997) and 
updated by David Brady, Jason Beckfield, and John Stephens (April 2004), downloaded from 
www.lisproject.org on 20/01/2008. 
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Appendix III – Additional tables and figures 
 
Table A.1 – Descriptive statistics for main variables – sample means by countries – larger sample 
 
country GINI1 GINI2 LS1 P90/P10 UR BEN 
Australia 32.83 38.42 50.99 2.84 5.45 0.21 
Belgium 27.75 26.29 55.29 2.40 11.68 0.43 
Canada 36.03 31.20 54.11 4.24 8.55 0.28 
Denmark 32.86 32.07 55.48 2.18 7.19 0.53 
Finland 21.76 28.67 54.25 2.44 6.52 0.30 
France 38.33 39.19 53.26 3.31 7.30 0.30 
Germany 36.22 31.58 54.82 2.84 3.80 0.29 
Italy 34.71 34.67 48.11 2.33 6.52 0.03 
Japan na 34.86 49.73 3.07 1.75 0.11 
Korea na 34.18 41.25 3.97 na na 
Netherlands 28.55 28.55 54.44 2.51 10.14 0.51 
New Zealand 27.23 36.56 49.29 2.94 5.17 0.31 
Norway 22.64 32.60 48.14 2.09 4.33 0.39 
Sweden 47.12 31.40 58.93 2.06 1.70 0.14 
United Kingdom 27.52 25.98 58.13 3.25 6.43 0.23 
United States 37.58 35.49 57.58 4.08 6.02 0.12 
Total 33.98 31.69 54.98 3.02 5.92 0.23 
 
Legend: Variables as in table A.3. 
 
Table A.2 – Sample sizes for main variables – larger sample 
 
COUNTRY GINI1 GINI2 LS1 P90/P10 UR BEN 
Australia 6 13 44 25 36 40 
Belgium 4 6 44 8 41 40 
Canada 24 28 43 12 36 40 
Denmark 10 4 34 11 39 40 
Finland 14 14 44 21 41 40 
France 6 6 41 39 41 40 
Germany 28 10 44 15 41 40 
Italy 23 18 44 11 41 40 
Japan na 26 44 25 41 40 
Korea na 21 34 16 na na 
Netherlands 9 17 35 23 41 40 
New Zealand 3 18 34 14 36 40 
Norway 10 13 34 12 36 40 
Sweden 26 16 44 24 41 40 
United Kingdom 36 31 44 31 41 40 
United States 37 32 44 28 41 40 
Total 236 273 651 315 593 600 
 
Legend: Variables as in table A.3.  
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Table A.3 – Descriptive statistics for variables in the dataset – sample means – larger sample 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GINI1 236 33.981 7.295 19.900 54.300 
P90/P10 142 3.024 0.774 1.953 4.630 
LS1 236 54.980 4.136 42.558 64.909 
UR 236 5.916 3.194 0.400 16.800 
BEN 233 0.235 0.138 0.003 0.562 
COW 234 1.936 0.718 1 3 
UDNET 236 0.445 0.182 0.102 0.837 
MINIM 236 0.804 0.258 0.327 1.000 
TW 233 0.508 0.102 0.297 0.783 
FEMALE 234 0.531 0.111 0.159 0.759 
OVER65 236 0.166 0.023 0.112 0.211 
EDU 236 10.055 1.476 6.179 12.475 
KPW 214 10.226 0.341 9.076 10.826 
OIL 236 3.912 2.516 -0.291 10.864 
OPENC 232 49.885 23.247 9.259 146.449 
WELFARE 236 13.623 4.520 5.000 28.909 
 
Legend: 
GINI1 = Gini index on personal income distribution, from Brandolini 2003 
GINI2 = Gini index on personal income distribution, from WIDER 
P90/P10 = ratio between 90th and 10th percentile in earnings distribution, from OECD 
LS1 = labour share on value added at market price, from OECD-Stan database 
UR = unemployment rate, from Nickell-Nunziata 2001 
BEN = unemployment benefit, from OECD 2001 
COW = bargaining coordination (1-3), from Nickell-Nunziata 2001 
UDNET = union density, from Nickell-Nunziata 2001 
MINIM = ratio of minimum wage to median wage, from OECD 
TW = tax wedge, from Nickell-Nunziata 2001 
FEMALE = female participation rate, from OECD Labour force statistics 
OVER65 = Proportion of population over 15 that is over 65 years of age, from Comparative welfare states data set  
EDU = average years of schooling of population 25 and over, whether studying or not, from Cohen and Soto (2007) 
KPW = (log of) capital per worker, from Summer and Heston 1991, updated with mark 5.6 of the Penn tables 
OIL = (log of) oil price in national currency, from IMF Financial Statistics 
OPENC = export+import/gdp at current prices, from OECD database 
WELFARE = Total social security transfers as % of GDP, from Comparative welfare states data set (www.lisproject.org) 
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Table A.4 –  Pairwise correlation matrix - larger sample 
 
 GINI1 P90/P10 LS1 UR BEN COW UDNET MINIM TW FEMALE OVER65 EDU KPW OIL OPENC 
GINI1 1.0000               
P90/P10 0.3598* 1.0000              
LS1 0.1509* -0.0584 1.0000             
UR -0.3174* -0.0082 0.0633 1.0000            
BEN -0.4705* -0.4325* 0.1244* 0.3204* 1.0000           
COW 0.0951 -0.6810* -0.0471 -0.4050* 0.1966* 1.0000          
UDNET -0.1112 -0.6823* 0.2038* -0.0050 0.2213* 0.3754* 1.0000         
MINIM -0.1605* -0.5864* -0.1191* -0.1770* -0.0623 0.3265* 0.5936* 1        
TW -0.0581 -0.4729* 0.1081* 0.3127* 0.2933* 0.1506* 0.4027* 0.2893* 1       
FEMALE -0.0210 -0.1095 0.1854* 0.0685 0.1726* 0.0418 0.4032* 0.1241* 0.2942* 1      
OVER65 -0.1133 -0.4717* 0.2098* 0.3289* 0.2665* 0.1762* 0.4115* 0.2920* 0.5999* 0.3112* 1     
EDU -0.0664 0.0567 0.3390* 0.3646* 0.2232* -0.1166* 0.0204 -0.3134* -0.0103 0.5469* 0.3348* 1    
KPW -0.0517 -0.2881* 0.3319* 0.4403* 0.2425* 0.0781 0.0661 -0.2062* 0.3469* 0.3123* 0.4624* 0.6464* 1   
OIL -0.0219 -0.1987* -0.4320* 0.2258* -0.1126* 0.1945* 0.0430 0.0462 0.2297* -0.0231 0.1550* -0.1956* -0.0065 1  
OPENC -0.3297* -0.5588* -0.0090 0.2564* 0.6227* 0.3448* 0.3652* 0.0634 0.2416* -0.0431 0.3681* 0.0659 0.2876* 0.0719 1 
WELFARE -0.2068* -0.4930* 0.1351* 0.5305* 0.5695* 0.1828* 0.1757* 0.0569 0.5968* 0.0810* 0.5918* 0.2398* 0.4324* 0.1086* 0.5248* 
 
Legend: Variables as in table A.3 - * indicates statistical significance above 95% 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.5  – Predictive ability of the model estimated in table 5 – Labour share 
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Figure A.6  – Predictive ability of the model estimated in table 5 – P90/P10 wage decile ratio  
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Figure A.7  – Predictive ability of the model estimated in table 5 – unemployment rate  
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   Table A.8 –  Dickey-Fuller Stationarity test for inequality measures  
 
COUNTRY GINI1 (obs) ∆GINI1 (obs) GINI2 (obs) ∆GINI2 (obs) 
Australia na na na na 
Belgium 0.346 (3) na 0.433 (3) na 
Canada -2.893** (23) -7.211***(22) -1.514 (26) -5.830*** (25) 
Denmark -4.105*** (9) -1.194 (8) na na 
Finland -2.687* (9) -4.437*** (8) 1.531 (10) -1.343 (9) 
France na na na na 
Germany -1.719 (25) -3.972*** (24) -1.209 (6) -0.533 (5) 
Italy -4.368*** (22) -3.852*** (21) -2.977** (17) -3.956*** (16) 
Japan na na na na 
Korea na na na na 
Netherlands -0.109 (8) -2.394 (7) -0.952 (16) -3.187** (15) 
New Zealand na na na na 
Norway -0.858 (9) -4.053*** (9) -1.083 (8) 0.183 (6) 
Sweden -1.654 (25) -1.357 (23) -6.694*** (13) -4.130*** (11) 
United Kingdom 0.191 (35) -5.960*** (34) 0.819 (30) -5.239*** (29) 
United States 0.651 (36) -5.409*** (34) 0.290 (31) -4.736*** (29) 
* stationary at 10%; ** stationary at 5%; *** stationary at 1% 
 
 
Table A.9 –  Determinants of personal income inequality – larger and common samples – OLS 
first differences 
 
 larger sample common sample 
 1 2 3 4 
∆ labour share at market price  -0.157 -0.072 -0.138 -0.087 
 [2.38]** [0.85] [1.85]* [0.89] 
∆ extended p90/p10 decile ratio 0.46 0.791 0.834 1.431 
 [1.16] [1.46] [1.76]* [1.67]* 
∆unemployment rate 0.02 0.1 0.031 0.139 
 [0.16] [0.71] [0.22] [0.80] 
∆ unemployment benefit -0.772 -0.379 -2.169 -2.277 
 [0.15] [0.13] [0.43] [0.66] 
∆ average years of education -3.289 2.22 -0.453 3.806 
 [1.09] [0.63] [0.12] [0.99] 
∆ female labour force participation (15-64) -1.6 -0.953 -1.321 -0.273 
 [2.55]** [0.71] [1.43] [0.30] 
∆ proportion of population aged 65 or more  13.594 -20.91 35.116 -60.168 
 [0.30] [0.40] [0.65] [0.75] 
∆ social security transfers as % of GDP  -0.03 -0.023 -0.044 -0.239 
 [0.15] [0.12] [0.21] [1.06] 
∆ exports plus imports as % of GDP -0.038 -0.03 -0.02 -0.022 
 [2.27]** [1.73]* [1.33] [1.20] 
Constant yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects  yes  yes 
Observations 181♣ 181♣ 120♠ 120♠ 
Number of countries 11 11 10 10 
R² 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.33 
 
Robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Controls for changes in definition included. 
♣ Countries included: Belgium (3), Canada (23), Denmark (9), Finland (9), Germany (23), Italy (22), Netherlands (8), Norway (7), Sweden 
(20), United Kingdom (27), United States (30). 
♠ Countries included: Canada (11), Denmark (9), Finland (9), Germany (10), Italy (10), Netherlands (8), Norway (6), Sweden (11), United 
Kingdom (23), United States (23). 
 
 
55
Table A.10 – Determinants of personal income inequality – 3SLS regressions – Gini index from 
WIDER 
 
 common sample 
 1 2 3 4 
 gini2 labour share 
decile 
ratio 
unempl. 
rate 
labour share at market price -0.755    
 [2.38]**    
p90/p10 decile ratio 8.954    
 [2.58]***    
unemployment rate 1.168    
 [2.82]***    
unemployment benefit -13.647 5.67 -1.364 9.908 
 [1.78]* [0.98] [2.64]*** [1.79]* 
union density rate  -7.704 -0.528 -4.854 
  [1.32] [1.02] [0.87] 
bargaining coordination  0.741 -0.036 -1.077 
  [1.43] [0.73] [2.17]** 
ratio minimum/median wage  0.093 -0.536 0.885 
  [0.04] [2.24]** [0.37] 
tax wedge    -3.008 
    [0.55] 
average years of education   -0.078  
   [0.44]  
log oil price in national currency  2.514   
  [2.79]***   
log capital per worker  12.455 -0.362 -1.984 
  [5.51]*** [1.94]* [0.89] 
female labour force participation (15-64) -0.186    
 [0.04]    
proportion of population aged 65 or more  79.31    
 [1.76]*    
social security transfers as % of GDP  -0.33    
 [1.16]    
exports plus imports as % of GDP -0.033   -0.071 
 [0.58]   [2.51]** 
Constant yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 126♣ 126♣ 126♣ 126♣ 
Number of countries 13 13 13 13 
Root mean squared error 1.91 1.2 0.1 1.11 
R² 0.83 0.92 0.98 0.86 
  
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Controls for changes in definition included. 
♣ Countries included: Australia (7), Belgium (4), Canada (9), Finland (4), France (5), Italy (6), Japan (13), Netherlands (15), New Zealand 
(3), Norway (4), Sweden (15), United Kingdom (22), United States (19). 
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Figure A.11 – Gini indices of income inequality 
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Figure A.12 – Labour shares  
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